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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Joseph Henry was employed as a correctional officer at the Department of 
Correction's Idaho State Correctional Institute ("ISCI"). On the morning of November 
15, 2009, sometime prior to his departure from his home, Mr. Henry became aware he 
was running late for work. (Hrng. Tr., p. 110, 1. 20 p. Ill, 1. 2.) He exited his house, 
entered a car that had been parked outside throughout the night and proceeded to drive 
for approximately 45 minutes to his worksite. (Hrng. Tr., p. 109, 1. 20- p. 110, 1. 1; p. 32, 
Is. 20-23.) Upon his arrival at ISCI, Mr. Henry parked his car and proceeded to the 
Administration Building where he checked in and underwent a routine inspection. 
Thereafter, he left the building and walked briskly approximately 450 yards down a 
walkway to reach Unit 15, his assigned work station. (Hrng. Tr., p. 35, 1. 4- p. 37, 1. 19.) 
Upon his arrival to the control room of Unit 15, co-workers observed he looked kind of 
funny and asked if he was okay. Mr. Henry was sweaty. (Hrng. Tr., p. 38, Is. 4-9.) 
After resting over a period of approximately 30 minutes, the Appellant's symptoms 
escalated and he requested medical assistance. Mr. Henry was transported to St. 
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center where he was later diagnosed as having suffered a 
myocardial infarction involving an occlusion of the obtuse marginal branch of the 
circumflex coronary artery. (Parent Depo., p. 8, Is. 17-20.) The Appellant was 
discharged two days later after undergoing placement of a stent in the affected artery. 
(Parent Depo., p. 7, Is. 16-23.) Then, on November 25, 2009, he was readmitted to the 
hospital after developing additional cardiac problems which ultimately resulted in a triple 
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bypass procedure involving the right coronary artery. (Parent Depo., p. 21, I. 20 -
p. 23, I. 3.) 
Mr. Henry subsequently filed a claim with the State Insurance Fund alleging he 
suffered a heart attack in the course and scope of his employment on November 15,2009. 
He contended his heart attack arose as a result of the activities he engaged in upon his 
arrival at work exerting himself by walking briskly in the cold temperature of an early 
morning, while anxious regarding the possibility of arriving late to his post. A hearing 
was conducted before Referee LaDawn Marsters on February 14, 2011. On July 15, 
2011, the members of the Industrial Commission approved, confirmed and adopted the 
Referee's proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and issued an Order finding 
that while Mr. Henry's work activities as described would constitute an "accident," he 
had failed to meet his burden of proving those activities caused or contributed to the 
occurrence of his myocardial infarction. Mr. Henry timely filed an appeal with the Idaho 
Supreme Court on July 29,2011. 
II. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Did the Industrial Commission Utilize the Appropriate Legal Standard in 
Finding Claimant Failed to Meet His Burden of Proving His Injury Was 
Sustained in an Industrial Accident? 
B. Is the Industrial Commission's Finding That Claimant Failed to Prove His 
Injury Was Sustained in an Industrial Accident Supported by Substantial 
and Competent Evidence? 
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III. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Industrial Commission Utilized the Appropriate Legal Standard in 
Finding Claimant Failed to Meet His Burden of Proving His Injury Was 
Sustained in an Industrial Accident 
Appellant cites Paragraph 41 of the Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Recommendation adopted by the Commission as evidence that the 
Commission applied an incorrect burden of proof with respect to causation. Respondents 
contend the Appellant misconstrues the intent of the language in that paragraph and assert 
the wording of the Industrial Commission's decision in its entirety demonstrates the 
Commission utilized the appropriate legal standard. Paragraph 42 of the Commission's 
decision states: 
The Referee finds Claimant has failed to establish to a reasonable degree of 
medical probability that his heart attack was triggered by his activities at 
work on November 15,2009. In the final analysis, Dr. Parent's testimony 
is insufficient to establish that Claimant's post-arrival activities were 
responsible for causing or contributing to the occurrence of Claimant's 
myocardial infarction. The evidence just as easily supports the 
proposition that it was something that happened prior to Claimant's 
arrival at the worksite that made his heart attack inevitable and caused 
it to occur when and how it did. (Emphasis added.) 
R., pp. 28-29. 
Nowhere in the Commission's decision is there language suggesting it required 
Mr. Henry to establish causation as exclusively due to a single work-related factor. The 
language of Paragraph 42 reflects the Industrial Commission made a finding of fact that 
Appellant had not proved to a reasonable degree of medical probability his work 
activities either caused or contributed to his heart attack that day. The Commission 
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found the evidence insufficient to establish there was any causal relationship between his 
work and the onset of his heart attack. Paragraph 41 of the Commission's decision, when 
read in conjunction with Paragraph 42, clearly establishes that in weighing Dr. Parent's 
testimony the Commission found it was not sufficient to establish causation because the 
evidence in the case led to the conclusion it was just as probable Mr. Henry's heart attack 
was solely due to events occurring prior to his arrival at work. 
It is conceded that under Idaho's Workers' Compensation Law the existence of a 
preexisting condition does not negate the compensability of an industrial accident. While 
Respondents question Appellant's reliance on Bowman v. Twin Falls Construction Co., 
99 Idaho 312, 581 P.2d 770 (1978), overruled by Demain v. Bruce McLaughlin Logging, 
132 Idaho 782, 979 P.2d 655 (1999) (rehearing denied), as support for that proposition, 
in applicable cases a claimant need only establish to a reasonable degree of medical 
probability that he sustained injuries in an accident which aggravated or exacerbated a 
preexisting condition in order to recover benefits. Wynn v. J.R. Simplot Co., 105 Idaho 
102, 666 P.2d 629 (1983). 
Appellant cites to the Court's decision in Bowman as grounds for establishing the 
Industrial Commission held the Appellant to an improper standard of proof. In Bowman, 
the claimant was rendered totally and permanently disabled after contracting emphysema. 
The Industrial Commission denied the compensability of Mr. Bowman's occupational 
disease claim based on evidence establishing his employment was not a major factor 
contributing to his lung disease, that the disease had not been contracted during his 
employment and it was not characteristic of and peculiar to his occupation. During the 
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hearing, one of the Commissioners directed counsel to rephrase his questioning of a 
medical expert and ask the expert if his opinion was based on a reasonable degree of 
medical certainty rather than medical probability. On appeal, the Court noted that the 
proper test was a reasonable degree of probability, not certainty. Bowman, supra 317, 
775. The Industrial Commission's findings with respect to causation were found to 
suggest the Commission was seeking causation proved to a medical certainty. The Court 
held that, "An ultimate finding based upon an improper application of law to the facts 
cannot stand," and remanded the case back to the Commission for a redetermination of 
the causation issue under the proper standard. Bowman, supra, at 318, 776. 
A plain reading of the Industrial Commission's decision in this case, however, 
demonstrates the Commission ruled the medical evidence was insufficient to establish 
Mr. Henry suffered any injury whatsoever in the course and scope of his employment on 
November 15, 2009. There was no finding that Mr. Henry's work activities contributed 
to his heart attack, even to a slight degree. There was no finding that Claimant's heart 
attack was caused by a combination of preexisting conditions and injuries arising from an 
industrial accident. The Commission did not impose a burden on the Claimant that he 
must show his industrial accident was the sole cause of his heart attack to the exclusion of 
all other possible contributing causes. Had that been the burden of proof the Commission 
imposed on the Appellant, the Commission could have simply issued a summary decision 
finding Mr. Henry's claim was not compensable based on Dr. Parent's letter to the 
Defendants dated October 25, 2010, in which he opined that the Claimant's heart attack 
was fifty percent due to his longstanding risk factors. (Jt. Ex. 12, pp. 2-3.) 
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The Industrial Commission was not persuaded by the medical evidence that it was 
medically more probable than not that the Claimant's injuries arose as a result of an 
industrial accident. The applicable legal standard was cited and followed. So long as the 
Commission's finding of fact is supported by substantial and competent evidence, it must 
be upheld on appeal. 
B. Substantial and Competent Evidence Supports the Industrial Commission's 
Finding That Appellant Failed to Prove His Injuries Were Sustained in an 
Industrial Accident 
As noted, "A claimant has the burden of proving to a reasonable degree of medical 
probability that his or her injury was caused by an industrial accident." Anderson v. 
Harper's, Inc., 143 Idaho 193, 196, 141 P.3d 1062, 1065 (2006), citing Gooby v. Lake 
Shore Mgmt. Co., 136 Idaho 79, 29 P.3d 390 (2001). 
Whether an injury arose from the course of employment is a question of 
fact to be decided by the Commission. This Court reviews the 
Commission's findings of fact exclusively to determine whether substantial 
and competent evidence supports those findings. Idaho Code Section 72-
732(1). This Court does not scrutinize the weight and credibility of the 
evidence relied upon by the Commission, but construes that evidence in the 
light most favorable to the party prevailing before it. We will disturb the 
Commission's findings regarding weight and credibility only if they are 
clearly erroneous. 
Roberts v. Kit Manufacturing Company, Inc., 124 Idaho 946, 947, 866 P.2d 969, 
970 (1993) (citations omitted.) (Rehearing denied). "Evidence is 'substantial and 
competent' if a reasonable mind might accept such evidence as adequate and sufficient to 
support a conclusion." Taylor v. Soran Restaurant, Inc., 131 Idaho 525, 527, 960 P.2d 
1264, 1266 (1998). "To be substantial, the Commission must have 'more than a scintilla' 
of evidence supporting its conclusion." Hamilton v. Ted Beamis Logging & 
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Construction, 127 Idaho 221,223,899 P.2d 434, 436 (1995) (Rehearing denied.), citing 
Becker v. Flaggers, 120 Idaho 521, 817 P .2d 187 (1991). "The Court has consistently 
recognized the Industrial Commission as the arbiter of conflicting facts and has 
acknowledged that the weight to be accorded evidence is within the Commission's 
particular province." Gage v. Express Personnel, 135 Idaho 250, 253, 16 PJd 926, 929 
(2000) (citation omitted). "It is the role of the Industrial Commission, not this Court, to 
determine the weight and credibility of testimony and to resolve conflicting 
interpretations of testimony." Henderson v. McCain Foods, Inc., 142 Idaho 559, 565, 
130 P.3d 1097,1103 (2006), citing Lopez v. State, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 
136 Idaho 174,30 P.3d 952 (2001). 
Appellant relies heavily on the opinions of his treating cardiologist, Dr. Mark 
Parent, in asserting that the Industrial Commission erred in denying his claim. He 
contends that Dr. Parent was the only medical expert to testify regarding causation and 
his burden of proof was met as a result of producing medical evidence on which a causal 
relationship could be established. Dr. Parent did provide evidence on which the 
Industrial Commission could have relied in making a ruling in favor of Mr. Henry. 
However, the Commission considered additional evidence in the record, including other 
portions of Dr. Parent's testimony, and determined that it outweighed the evidence in 
support of Mr. Henry's contention that his injury arose out of and in the course of 
employment. A review of the record in this case establishes sufficient and adequate 
evidence on which the Commission reasonably based its finding that Claimant's injury 
did not arise in the course of his employment. 
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Dr. Parent did, indeed, testify it was his opinion the Appellant's activities on his 
arrival at work on the date of injury more probably than not contributed to the onset of 
his myocardial infarction. (Parent Depo., p. 48, 1. 25- p. 49, 1. 11.) However, the 
Commission chose not to accept Dr. Parent's opinion on causation. The Commission 
found the existence of evidence to the contrary and, upon weighing the conflicting 
evidence, chose not to rely on Dr. Parent's opinion, as was within its purview. "It is well 
established that the opinion of an expert is not binding on the trier of fact and, provided 
the trier of fact does not act arbitrarily, may be rejected even when uncontradicted." 
Simpson v. Johnson, 100 Idaho 357, 362,597 P.2d 600,605 (1979). (Citations omitted.) 
"The Industrial Commission, as the factfinder, is free to determine the weight to be given 
the testimony of a medical expert." Henderson v. McCain Foods, Inc., supra, at 
566, 1104. (Citations omitted.) 
During his post-hearing deposition, Dr. Parent addressed the issue of what factors 
may trigger the onset of a heart attack. He conceded the trigger is unknown in many 
cases. He also stated that scientific research has identified certain times of the day, 
certain kinds of activity and certain kinds of stress that are more likely to trigger a heart 
attack. (Parent Depo., p. 49, 1. 20- p. 50, 1. 12.) Dr. Parent testified that cold weather and 
anxiety cause constriction of the artery size and that mental stress, anxiety, exercise and 
cold weather increase blood pressure. The simultaneous development of those two 
conditions has been found to trigger heart attacks. (Parent Depo., p. 42, 1. 19 - p. 43, 1. 
11.) Further, Dr. Parent indicated the release of certain hormones during stress and 
anxiety can cause an atherosclerotic plaque to rupture. He testified that, when an 
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atherosclerotic plaque ruptures, that IS the inciting event of a coronary thrombosis. 
(Parent Depo., p. 43, Is. 12-21.) 
Dr. Parent rendered his OpInIOn with respect to causation based on the 
presumption that conditions known to trigger heart attacks in some instances were present 
when the Appellant arrived at ISCI on November 15,2009. A letter issued to him by Mr. 
Henry's counsel dated April 6, 2010, related that Mr. Henry had arrived at work very 
early in the morning, that the temperature was below freezing and he was late for work 
and worried about his job. (1t. Ex. 13, pp. 1-2.) Dr. Parent opined in his response letter, 
" ... knowing these other details of the temperature, the time of day, the activity level and 
the mental stress he was under, I think it is quite likely that those factors contributed to 
his myocardial infarction that day." (1t. Ex. 12, p. 9.) 
In its ruling, the Industrial Commission found that many of the triggers associated 
with the onset of a heart attack were present before Mr. Henry's arrival at the work site. 
Mr. Henry knew he was late for work before he left home that day. All of Mr. Henry's 
activities that day took place during early morning hours and he had already been 
exposed to cold temperatures prior to arriving at ISCI after he stepped outside in 
Caldwell and entered a car which had been parked outside overnight to begin his 
commute to work. As the trier of fact, the Industrial Commission was free to consider the 
weight to give Dr. Parent's opinion regarding causation. The Commission's decision 
reflects it gave considerable weight to evidence establishing Mr. Henry was already 
exposed to many of the risk factors that Dr. Parent felt incited Henry's heart attack before 
he arrived at work on the date in question. 
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With respect to the issue of causation, the Industrial Commission also considered 
evidence regarding the timing of the onset of Claimant's symptoms. In his deposition 
testimony, Dr. Parent stated, "What scientifically you can say is when the onset of 
symptoms occurred, the artery at that time did close, and the heart attack began at that 
time." (Parent Depo., p. 52, l. 24 - p. 53, l. 2.) 
The Commission noted the post-hearing deposition of Bret Kimmell, a 
correctional officer with the rank of sergeant. Mr. Kimmell testified that in a telephone 
conversation he had with Mr. Henry subsequent to Mr. Henry's heart attack, the 
Appellant had related to him that he had not been feeling well on his way to work on 
November 15,2009. (Kimmel Depo., p. 11, l. 21- p. 12, l. 18.) 
The Commission also cited to Mr. Henry's own deposition testimony indicating 
that on the date of injury, upon his arrival at the Administration Building to check in, the 
shift lieutenant or his designee told him that he did not look well. The Appellant related 
that he had forgotten about the comment but was later reminded after the fact. (Henry 
Depo., p. 70, l. 19 - p. 71, l. 10.) 
As further evidence suggesting the Appellant's symptoms had begun before his 
arrival at work, the Commission noted that in a letter submitted to Dr. Parent dated April 
6, 2010, Appellant's counsel had indicated that upon Mr. Henry's arrival at the 
Administration Building on the day of his heart attack, "he did not feel very good, kind of 
had a general feeling of malaise, but had no specific symptoms." (1t. Ex. 13, p. 1.) 
Substantial and competent evidence appears in the record to support the 
Commission's finding that the Claimant's symptoms had begun prior to his arrival at his 
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worksite. As the trier of fact, the Commission was entitled to determine the weight to 
give the evidence in the record pertaining to the time of the onset of Claimant's 
symptoms. 
Additional evidence appears in the record to support the Commission's finding 
that it was just as likely the Claimant's heart attack was the result of something that 
happened prior to his arrival at the worksite as it was likely to be related to something 
after his arrival. Dr. Parent testified that an occlusion of the obtuse marginal branch 
precipitated the Claimant's heart attack on November 15, 2009. (Parent Depo., p. 13, Is. 
22-25.) Dr. Parent also testified that when an atherosclerotic plaque ruptures, that is the 
inciting event of a coronary thrombosis. (Parent Depo., p. 43, Is. 20-21.) He stated, "So 
anxiety, cold weather, physical activity, you have all the milieu in place to cause a 
coronary thrombosis to occur." (Parent, Depo., p. 43, Is. 22-24.) It was reasonable for 
the trier of fact to conclude that in Mr. Henry's case, conditions existed that could have 
initiated the rupturing of atherosclerotic plaque before he reported to the work site, thus 
making the development of a coronary thrombosis and heart attack inevitable. And, as 
Dr. Parent testified, it is not possible to determine with any certainty when that process 
began. (Parent Depo., p. 53, Is. 11-19.) It is as likely to have occurred before the 
Appellant presented to work as it is after. 
During his post-hearing deposition, Dr. Parent reiterated his opinion with respect 
to causation. He confirmed the opinion he gave was based on the history Mr. Henry had 
provided to him. (Parent Depo., p. 54, Is. 6-9.) He conceded the Appellant had not 
related to him the events and circumstances preceding his arrival at work that day. 
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(Parent Depo., p. 53, Is. 19-22.) Dr. Parent was asked to reassess his OpInIOn on 
causation based on the assumption of additional facts pertaining to Mr. Henry's activities 
prior to his arrival at work on the day of his heart attack. The Industrial Commission set 
out Dr. Parent's response at length in its decision. (R., pp. 20-22.) In short, Dr. Parent 
testified that those stressors should have been considered but he could not determine with 
any scientific certainty what percentage the events preceding Mr. Henry's arrival at work 
contributed to the occurrence of his heart attack. Dr. Parent stated: 
But can you say where along that day or the day before what was stressing 
his system, when was this - when was the inevitable day that this thing was 
going to happen? You have to look at it, I think, major stressors and minor 
stressors. And if I look at things, you know, the cold car, the cold steering 
wheel, the driving through the traffic, were those stressors that were 
contributing? They likely could have been, should have been, you know, 
considered. But can you - how far can you dissect that down? That's 
where I get in trouble of dissecting down all those, you know, minute 
events that begin to occur. 
(Parent Depo., p. 53, Is. 3-15.) 
The Commission concluded, based on competent evidence in the record, including 
some of the testimony of Dr. Parent, that it was impossible to determine which of the 
events or activities of November 15,2009, made the heart attack Mr. Henry suffered that 
date inevitable. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Conflicting evidence with respect to the issue of causation was before the 
Industrial Commission in this case. As elaborated upon above, after evaluating the 
weight and credibility of that evidence, the Commission made a reasonable determination 
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that the evidence failed to establish Mr. Henry's heart attack arose out of an industrial 
accident. The Commission relied on evidence pertaining to Mr. Henry's environment 
and circumstances both prior to and after his arrival at the work site, evidence of his 
symptoms and physical condition both before and upon his arrival at work and medical 
testimony regarding factors that may cause or contribute to the onset of a heart attack. 
The record establishes the Industrial Commission based its finding that Mr. Henry had 
not met his burden of proving he suffered an industrial accident on more than a scintilla 
of evidence. Although the evidence was conflicting, viewing all facts and inferences in a 
light most favorable to the party that prevailed before the Industrial Commission, the 
Court must conclude there is substantial and competent evidence to sustain the 
Commission's ruling. The Respondents respectfully assert that the Industrial 
Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order must be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of December, 2011. 
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